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Issues and Findings 
Discussed in this Brief: An inde-
pendent process evaluation of the 
Community Oriented Policing Ser-
vices (COPS) program, whose leg-
islative basis is Title I of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994. Covering pri-
marily the first 4 years of the COPS 
program but including some pro-
jections up to 2003, the evalua-
tion, sponsored by NIJ and 
conducted by the Urban Institute, 
is based on a series of nationwide 
telephone surveys, site visits, and 
case studies. The evaluation fo-
cuses primarily on COPS grants 
enabling law enforcement agen-
cies (1) to hire police officers to 
engage in community policing ac-
tivities, and (2) to redeploy existing 
officers to community policing by 
increasing officer productivity 
through the acquisition of technol-
ogy or by freeing up officers for 
community policing by filling some 
officer-held positions with civilians. 
Key issues: To what extent did 
the COPS program succeed in 
putting more officers on the street 
and, through its promotion of 
community policing, change the 
practice of policing in the United 
States? Did the distribution of 
COPS mirror the disparity in crime 
levels among jurisdictions? How 
satisfied were grantees with the 
COPS application and administra-
tion processes? Have grantees 
engaged in community policing 





The COPS Program After 4 Years-
National Evaluation 
by Jeffrey A. Roth and Joseph F. Ryan 
Nearly $9 billion of the $30 billion of 
expenditures authorized by the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994 (Crime Act) was allocated to the 
law's Title I, the legislative basis of what 
soon became known as the Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) pro-
gram. Title I listed four specific goals 
intended to change both the level and 
practice of policing in the United States: 
1. To increase the number of officers 
deployed in American communities. 
2. To foster problem solving and inter-
action with communities by police 
officers. 
3. To encourage innovation in policing. 
4. To develop new technologies for assist-
ing officers in reducing crime and its 
consequences. 
Over a 6-year period, the approximately 
$9 billion was to fund three primary ap-
proaches to achieving the foregoing goals. 
The first approach involved the award of 
3-year grants to law enforcement agencies 
for hiring police officers to engage in 
community policing activities. The sec-
ond was to award grants for acquiring 
technology, hiring civilians, and, initially, 
paying officer overtime-all with the 
intent of increasing existing officers' 
productivity and redeploying their saved 
time to community policing. The third 
approach was to award grants to agencies 
for innovative programs with special pur-
poses, such as reducing youth gun vio-
lence and domestic violence. 
The hiring grants were limited to 75 per-
cent of each hired officer's salary and 
fringe benefits, normally up to a "3-year 
cap" of $75,000. The grants for other 
resources were not limited by the cap. 
Normally, grantees were required to 
match the grants with at least 25 percent 
of program costs, to submit acceptable 
strategies for implementing community 
policing in their jurisdictions, and to 
retain the COPS-funded officer positions 
using local funds after the 3-year grants 
expired. Funds were authorized to reim-
burse up to $5,000 of training costs for 
former military personnel hired under 
the Act. 
Further, the Act required simplified 
application procedures for jurisdictions 
with populations of less than 50,000 and 
mandated an equal distribution of funds 
between jurisdictions with populations 
of more than and less than 150,000. 
As with most Federal grant programs, 
COPS-funded resources were required 
to supplement local expenditures, not 
supplant or replace them . 
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Issues and Findings 
continued ... 
by building partnerships, solving prob-
lems, and doing crime prevention? 
Key findings: Among the principal find-
ings of the evaluation are the following: 
• By May 1999, 100,500 officers and 
equivalents had been funded . Of them, 
preliminary estimates indicate that be-
tween 84,700 and 89,400 will have been 
deployed by 2003. Because some officers 
will have departed before others begin 
service, the federally funded increase 
(based on awards through May 1999) in 
policing levels will peak in 2001 between 
69,000 and 84,600 before falling to 
62,700-83,900 in 2003. These estimates 
will be revised as data collected in mid-
2000 are analyzed. The COPS Office has 
continued to award grants since May 
1999. 
• The program accelerated transitions 
to locally defined versions of community 
policing. COPS funds seem more likely to 
have fueled movements toward adoption 
To meet the requirements of Title I, 
eight initiatives were undertaken: 
l. Within a month after the Crime Act 
was signed into law, COPS Phase I 
grants for hiring officers were 
awarded to agencies that had previ-
ously applied unsuccessfully for 
grants under the previous Police 
Hiring Supplement (PHS) program; 
together, COPS Phase I and PHS 
funded nearly 4, 700 officers. 
2. Also within that month, the 
Department of Justice created a 
new agency, the COPS Office, to 
administer the new grant program. 
3. In November, the COPS Office 
established two grant programs for 
hiring officers: Funding Acceler- f~t{~i1 
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of community policing that were already 
accelerating than to have caused the 
acceleration. 
• An analysis found that the 1 percent of 
COPS grantees with the largest 1997 mur-
der counts received 31 percent of all COPS 
funds awarded through 1997. The 10 per-
cent of grantees with the highest murder 
counts received 50 percent of total COPS 
awards. 
• COPS application procedures and 
customer service orientation resulted in 
many smaller police agencies reporting 
high levels of satisfaction with the 
program's application and administrative 
processes. Larger agencies tended to 
find administrative requirements no less 
burdensome than those of other grant 
programs. 
• Building partnerships with communities 
by COPS grantees was commonplace in 
many of the agencies visited but, all too 
ated for Small Towns (COPS FAST), 
with simplified application proce-
dures for small agencies; and Ac-
celerated Hiring, Education, and 
Deployment (COPS AHEAD), with 
more stringent application proce-
dures, for large agencies. Later, 
these two programs were succeeded 
by the Universal Hiring Program 
(UHP) for all jurisdictions regard-
less of size. 
4. Within a few months, the COPS 
Office created the Making Officer 
Redeployment Effective (COPS 
MORE) program to fund technol-
ogy, civilians, and overtime (the 
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often, partnerships were in name only 
or simply standard, temporary working 
arrangements. Most visited agencies did 
some form of problem solving, but form 
and visibility varied widely from agency to 
agency. In observed sites, crime prevention 
efforts abounded, primarily manifested as 
traditional programs now subsumed under 
the community policing label. 
• The COPS program facilitated the 
efforts of agency chief executives who 
were inclined toward innovation and rep-
resented perhaps the largest effort to 
bolster development of law enforcement 
technology since the 1967 President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice. COPS-funded 
technology is benefiting localities but not 
yet meeting productivity projections. 
Target audience: State and local law 
enforcement agencies, State and local gov-
ernment administrators, Federal agencies 
and congressional committees involved in 
criminal justice issues, and researchers. 
5. To process training grants for hired 
military personnel, the COPS Office 
established the Troops to COPS 
program. 
6. To address local law enforcement 
needs other than new officers and 
other resources, the COPS Office 
received authorization to administer 
the existing Comprehensive Com-
munities Program and created other 
grant programs to launch the Police 
Corps and to help grantees address 
such specific problems as domestic 
violence, youth firearms violence, 
gangs, methamphetamine, and 
school crime. 
7. To encourage and assist the polic-
ing field in its transition to commu-
nity policing, the COPS Office 
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funded four additional activities: 
the Community Policing Consor-
tium to provide training and techni-
cal assistance in community 
policing; its own Program, Policy 
Support, and Evaluation Division to 
conduct assessments and evalua-
tions of community policing activi-
ties; part of the policing research 
program of the National Institute of 
Justice (NIJ); and a network of Re-
gional Community Policing Insti-
tutes (RCPis), where educators, law 
enforcement agencies, and commu-
nity organizations collaborated in 
community policing research, dem-
onstration programs, training, and 
technical assistance. 
8. To foster compliance with the pro-
grammatic requirement to imple-
ment community policing and with 
all administrative requirements, the 
COPS Office undertook an exten-
sive program of information dis-
semination, training and technical 
assistance, telephone contact with 
grantees, legal reviews and opinion 
letters regarding grantees plans, 
and onsite monitoring by the COPS 
Office, working in conjunction with 
the Office of the Comptroller (OC), 
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
The national evaluation 
Under its policing research program, 
NIJ was asked to administer an inde-
pendent evaluation of the COPS pro-
gram; NIJ selected the Urban Institute 
(UI) to conduct it. In addition, NIJ 
awarded grants to various organiza-
tions to evaluate several components 
of the COPS program other than the 
hiring and COPS MORE programs. 
With NIJ's concurrence, the UI team 
excluded the innovative programs from 
its scope to avoid duplicating other 
evaluators' efforts. The PHS and COPS 
Phase I grants were awarded before 
all grantmaking innovations were 
adopted, and the award processes were 
fully completed before this evaluation 
began. Therefore, although UI counted 
those program resources in its analy-
ses, it did not single out those pro-
grams for separate program evaluation 
purposes. Finally, because the RCPis 
emerged well after the evaluation was 
under way and project resources com-
mitted, observations of their activities 
were limited to incidental findings 
onsite rather than a systematic 
evaluation. 
This Research in Brief presents Ul's 
national evaluation findings covering 
roughly the first 4 years of COPS, 
with primary focus on the COPS 
FAST, AHEAD, UHP, and MORE 
programs. Our work was guided by the 
logic model shown in exhibit 1, which 
outlines the COPS program and its 
intended effects. 
The model indicates that COP · pro-
gram outcomes depend on local deci-
sions and actions to a greater degr e 
than Federal block grant programs 
(in which formulas determine funding 
allocations) or discretionary programs 
(in which Federal officials select 
grantees based on detailed plans for 
using the funds). Starting from the up-
per left of the xhihit, distribution of 
C P ' resoUl'ces dep o :led OJ'I ligible 
ag n ·i s T sponses to a proposed ex-
change of Federal resources in return 
for local financial and programmatic 
commitments. The financial commit-
ments were to share the costs of the re-
sources during the life of the grant and 
to retain the COPS-funded officer po-
sitions thereafter. Grantees' program-
matic commitments were to police 
their jurisdictions following principles 
of community policing. 
As the COPS program was launched, 
neither the retention nor the commu-
nity policing commitment was fully 
spelled out at the Federal level. The 
retention requirement was not pre-
cisely defined until 1998. Consistent 
with community policing principles, 
grant applicants were required to de-
fine the concept locally by submitting 
their own strategies specifying how 
they would meet four broad objec-
tives-partnership building, problem 
solving, prevention, and organizational 
support of those objectives-using a 
plan tailored to local needs, resources, 
and context. Awards to applicants with 
inadequate ommuu:ity policing strate-
gies were accompanied hy a special 
condition requiring training and tech-
nical assistance hy the Community 
Policing Consortium. 
As shown in exhibit 1, successful ap-
plicants were to implement three kinds 
of organizational transitions. First, 
recipients of hiring grants had to re-
cruj t hiTe train, and deploy an influx 
of n w poli. e officers. Second, COPS 
MORE grantees were obligated to 
a ctuire and implement technology, to 
hire civilians, or (under 1995 grants 
only) to manage officers' overtime, 
ther I y permitting the redeployment of 
offi. ers or full-time equivalents (FTEs) 
to community policing. Third, to ac-
commodate the demands of community 
poli ing, mo l agen j s n ed d to 
change U1eir organization · in various 
ways-ail explicit obje ' tiv of tb 
COPS program. 
As shown in the center of exhibit l, 
successful local implementation was 
to include advancement of three pro-
grammatic community policing objec-
tives specified by the COPS Office: 
problem solving, building partner-
ships with the community, and partici-
pating in prevention programs. In turn, 
DO NOT REMOVE FROM 
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grantees' expanded pursuit of those 
objectives affects local criminal justice 
agencies and other units of local 
government. 
The processes described above are the 
subjects of this Research in Brief. As 
a process evaluation, this study sets 
aside questions of community impact, 
represented in the shaded sector of the 
exhibit: how police and community ac-
tions stimulated by the COPS program 
affected levels of community satisfac-
tion with police, fear of crime, social 
and physical quality of life, levels of 
serious crime, etc. More specifically, 
this report addresses the seven major 
questions noted in the accompanying 
sidebar (see "Major Questions Ad-
dressed by the National Evaluation" 
on page 7). 
The answers to those questions were 
shaped by the history of the COPS 
program and its roots in presidential 
politics, academia, policing practice, 
and Federal assistance programs to 
local law enforcement and criminal 
justice agencies. Therefore, before 
this report addresses those evaluation 
questions, a review of the salient as-
pects of COPS history and roots is 
appropriate. 
The COPS program and 
its roots 
The COPS program can be viewed as 
the confluence of two forces. First, the 
1992 presidential campaign occurred 
when public confidence in the ability 
of government to control crime was 
low, fear of crime was high, and resis-
tance to Federal budget increases was 
even higher. In such a climate, a pro-
gram to "put 100,000 officers on the 
street" made sense, especially if done 
with a display of Federal efficiency at 
minimal cost. 
Second, over the preceding two de-
cades, some students and practitioners 
of policing had begun to develop ideas 
that collectively became known as 
"community policing." The meaning of 
the term was fuzzy-as many believe it 
should be because its essence involves 
tailoring program specifics to local 
needs and resources. Nevertheless, a 
consensus was emerging that commu-
nity policing had five main ingredi-
ents: solving underlying problems that 
linked seemingly unrelated incidents 
of crime and disorder instead of re-
sponding to them one by one; deem-
phasizing routine patrol and rapid 
response as primary crimefighting 
tools; involving the communities being 
policed as partners in identifying 
problems and planning or even execut-
ing responses; preventing crime 
through strategies for socializing chil-
dren and youth and for making high-
crime places safer; and changing 
organizations to support the other goals. 
From the standpoint of many police 
executives, a program that combined 
community policing with additional 
officers had both positive and negative 
aspects. Community policing encour-
aged police to share crime reduction 
responsibilities with other segments 
of their jurisdictions. Additional re-
sources are generally seen as useful, 
but involving other partners in decid-
ing how to use them can raise sensitive 
issues. Similarly, while at the time 
"more technology and more civilian 
employees" was hardly a politically 
viable Federal response to the Nation's 
fear and outrage over crime, several 
prominent police chiefs and mayors 
were arguing that those resources 
would be more useful than additional 
officers. 
For several years, beginning in 
the Bush administration, the U.S . 
•• • 4 • •• 
Department of Justice and other Fed-
eral departments had begun to rethink 
the mechanisms for distributing 
Federal financial assistance. Grant 
programs had begun inching toward 
bypassing States to deal directly with 
local governments, reducing adminis-
trative burdens, and lowering categori-
cal boundaries on how funds could be 
used. The difficult question was how 
to support local priorities in less con-
straining ways without giving up all 
F ederalleverage for shaping those 
priorities. Early programmatic steps 
in this direction included the Bush 
administration's Operation Weed and 
Seed and the Clinton administration's 
early Project PACT and Comprehen-
sive Communities Program. 
These factors challenged the COPS 
program with an extremely ambitious 
goal: encouraging law enforcement 
agencies across the Nation to hire 
100,000 officers and to adopt commu-
nity policing as a guiding philoso-
phy-without raising the Federal 
budget deficit. These objectives com-
pete, because burdensome measures 
taken to monitor compliance with the 
community policing requirement could 
diminish the attractiveness of the 
grants. Yet failure to monitor compli-
ance raises the danger that a program 
intended to increase the number of 
agencies doing community policing 
may reduce the quality of the commu-
nity policing they do. 
At the urging of several influential 
police chiefs who placed higher prior-
ity on acquiring technology and hiring 
civilians than on hiring new officers, 
the COPS MORE program was created 
to support these alternative resources. 
However, the statute obligated the 
COPS Office to require applicants to 
demonstrate that the productivity gains 
associated with these resources would 
I Researc h in Br i ef I 
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• Interagency cooperation 
• Capacity for change 
COPS IMPLEMENTATION 
Abbreviations and Symbols: 
FTEs: Full Time Equivalents 





(+) Problem Solving 
• Armlysis 




• Surveys, meetings 
• Citizen councils 
• Joint projects 
• Community capacity 
• Cross-agency collaboration 
(+) 
( +) Prevention 
• Prevention education 
• Code/truancy enforcement 
• Victim assistance 
OUTCOMES IN 
OTHER CJAs 
(+):Items listed in preceding box result in positive impact on, or increase in, items listed in the following box. 
(-) : Items listed in preceding box result in negative impact on, or decrease in, items listed in the following box. 
permit the redeployment of existing 
officers to the street at least as cost-
effectively as hiring grants. Other ben-
efits of civilians or technology were 
irrelevant under the statute. Lacking 
an experience base for estimating the 
productivity gains, most applicants 
succeeded in projecting that redeploy-
ment would occur cost-effectively. 
However, achieving the projected 
redeployment became contingent 
on grantees' ability to implement 
•• • 5 • •• 
technologies that were sometimes un-
familiar and, in the case of one key 
technology-wireless transmission of 
field reports-essentially unavailable 
at the start of the COPS program. 
•• • Research in Brief ••• 
Senior Justice Department officials 
concluded that demonstrating effec-
tiveness of the Federal Government in 
this complex mission required a new 
organization doing business in new 
ways. Therefore, a new Office of Com-
munity Oriented Policing Services was 
created within weeks after passage of 
the Crime Act and quickly became 
known as the COPS Office. The new 
agency undertook the heroic task of 
staffing up, announcing the COPS pro-
gram to all eligible grantee agencies, 
assuring that applications complied 
with programmatic requirements, and 
making award decisions, all within a 
few months. 
The COPS Office succeeded in pro-
cessing more than 10,000 grant awards 
in its first 4 months. While the early 
rounds of that work were completed 
before the national evaluation began, 
the design and implementation of the 
evaluation relied heavily on COPS 
Office manual and automated records. 
During that work, evaluators found 
that grant files typically showed evi-
dence of fairly thorough eligibility and 
programmatic review. The high accu-
racy levels of COPS Office records 
greatly facilitated our work. 
COPS grants were not exempt from 
standard Department of Justice budget 
review and administrative require-
ments, which are administered by the 
OC. For the relatively simple hiring 
grants, the combined COPS Office/OC 
process required about 7 months on 
average from application submission 
to signed acceptance of those awards. 
During startup, the COPS Office at-
tempted to reduce this delay with an 
"accelerated" procedure that permit-
ted agencies to hire officers after 
receiving an announcement letter 
but before formal obligation of grant 
awards; 50 percent of AHEAD grant-
ees and 35 percent of FAST grantees 
reported using this procedure. In some 
jurisdictions, local rules prevented 
agencies from hiring new officers 
before the official award. 
Formal review and approval of the 
more complex COPS MORE grants 
required an average of 11 months, 
even under normal circumstances. 
For many grantees, this delay was 
prolonged between October 1995 and 
April1996 while a Federal budget dis-
pute shut down OC grant reviews and 
left the COPS budget in doubt. Conse-
quently, an average of 16 months 
elapsed for 1995 MORE applicants 
between application submission and 
signed acceptance of the awards. 
During debates over the 1994 Crime 
Act, a Local Law Enforcement Block 
Grant (LLEBG) program had been pro-
posed unsuccessfully by Republicans 
as an alternative to the COPS program. 
After the 1994 elections, the LLEBG 
initiative resurfaced and COPS pro-
gram authorizations were reduced by 
about $500 million in the fiscal1996 
and subsequent budgets, with the 
$500 million reprogrammed to 
LLEBG. This reprogramming raised 
concerns that LLEBG, with its lower 
match requirement of only 10 percent 
and fewer restrictions on how funds 
could be spent, would reduce locali-
ties' interest in COPS grants. 
Despite these difficulties, the COPS 
Office "customer satisfaction" orienta-
tion succeeded at the outset with small 
agencies (i.e., those serving jurisdic-
tions of less than 50,000). Among 
small-agency Wave 1 survey respon-
dents with prior Federal grant experi-
ence, nearly 80 percent described 
COPS application and administration 
I • 6 •• 
as simpler than others, as of 1996. 
This compared with 40-50 percent 
among large agencies, which faced 
more elaborate application require-
ments, especially among MORE 
grantees, who had suffered the most 
consequences of the Federal budget 
confrontation and whose applications 
required more elaborate review. 
As startup difficulties were sur-
mounted, the COPS Office shifted its 
focus to program operations, which 
were intended to encourage implemen-
tation of community policing and new 
technology and to foster compliance 
with administrative regulations. The 
office expanded the Community Polic-
ing Consortium, which the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance had created in 
1993 to advance community policing, 
and created Innovative Community 
Oriented Policing programs. Some of 
those programs were intended to de-
velop innovative approaches to such 
problems as gangs, domestic violence, 
and methamphetamine. Others were 
intended to advance community polic-
ing in special environments, such as 
schools and distressed neighborhoods, 
to advance problem-solving skills, 
and to advance community policing 
through supportive organizational in-
novations. Finally, the COPS-funded 
RCPis brought academic, practitioner·, 
and community perspectives to bear 
on training and local innovation for 
community policing. 
To foster compliance with administra-
tive regulations, five units were 
involved. The COPS Office Legal 
Division defined compliance by inter-
preting Title I, writing regulations, 
and applying them to specific local 
circumstances. The Grants Division 
informed the field about requirements, 
reviewed applications for compliance, 
•• Research in Brie f •• 
Major Questions Addressed by the National Evaluation 
How did local agencies re-
spond to the exchange offered by 
the COPS program? The evaluation ad-
dressed this question primarily through 
three waves of national telephone sur-
veys. Wave 1 interviewed a representative 
sample of law enforcement agencies of 
all types and sizes, selected in May 1996 
and stratified to overrepresent COPS hir-
ing grantees, MORE grantees, and the 
nongrantees that were serving jurisdic-
tions of more than 50,000. Wave 2 inter-
viewed a new sample of agencies whose 
first COPS award was a 1996 UHP grant 
and reinterviewed members of the Wave 
1 MORE subsample with grants for mo-
bile computing technology. Wave 3 
reinterviewed the municipal and county 
police agencies that were interviewed in 
Wave 1 and either (a) belonged to the 
Wave 1 nongrantee or hiring grantee 
subsamples and served jurisdictions of 
more than 50,000, or ( b) belonged to 
the Wave 1 MORE subsample regardless 
of jurisdiction size. Under subcontract, 
the National Opinion Research Corpora-
tion collected the Wave 1 data in 
October-November 1996, Wave 2 in 
September-October 1997, and Wave 3 in 
June-July 1998. During June-July 2000, 
Wave 4 reinterviewed all agencies inter-
viewed in Wave 1. Additional information 
came to light during site visits to 30 
grantee agencies, conducted between 
early 1996 and 1998 by teams of re-
searchers and police practitioners. 
2. What distribution of COPS funds 
resulted from localities' application 
decisions through the end of 1997? 
Analyses of COPS Office grant manage-
ment databases addressed that question 
The analyses were updated several times 
between February 1996 and March 
1998. 
3. How did COPS hiring grantees ac-
complish their hiring and deployment 
objectives through mid-1998, and 
what were their expectations for re-
taining the COPS-funded officers? We 
addressed the hiring question primarily 
through the Wave 1 survey, the retention 
question primarily in the Wave 3 survey, 
and gathered supplemental information 
on both matters on site visits. The Wave 
4 survey updated information on both 
issues. 
4. How did COPS MORE grantees suc-
ceed in acquiring and implementing 
technology, hiring civilians, and 
achieving the projected redeploy-
ment targets through mid-1998? An 
analysis of a representative sample of 438 
grant files for 1995 MORE awards ascer-
tained what types of technology were 
awarded in the first year of the program. 
Implementation progress was the primary 
focus of the Wave 2 survey of all 183 
1995 MORE grantees that received 
MORE-funded mobile computers, the 
most commonly awarded type of tech-
nology. For all types of technology, the 
Wave 3 survey updated this information 
by asking all respondents about all their 
MORE grants, regardless of how the 
agency was selected at Wave 1 or when 
their MORE grants were awarded. 
5. What increases in policing levels 
were projected and achieved by local 
agencies using COPS resources? Toes-
timate increases through 1998 based on 
grants awarded through 1997, survey-
based estimates of hiring progress, tech-
nology implementation, and retention 
expectations were applied to the projec-
tions in COPS Office data. As a bench-
mark, we performed time-series analyses 
of 1989-96 data on sworn force size re-
ported in annual Uniform Crime Reports 
(UCR). 
• 7 • • " 
For a preliminary estimate of long-term 
increases in policing levels due to COPS 
hiring and MORE programs, the evalua-
tion applied factors estimated from the 
Wave 3 survey to COPS Office grant 
award counts as of May 12, 1999, when 
the White House announced achieve-
ment of the goal of funding 1 00,000 
police officers. We plan to updute this 
estimate based on the Wave 4 survey. 
6. To what extent had the COPS 
program succeeded by mid-1998 in 
encouraging grantees to build part-
nerships with communities, adopt 
problem-solving strategies, and par-
ticipate in prevention programs? To 
trace this evolution on a national basis, all 
three survey waves contained a checklist 
of tactics in support of these objectives. 
We compared grantee and nongrantee 
agencies' official statements on the ex-
tent to which these tactics were in place 
before 1995, were begun or expanded 
later, and were supported by COPS 
funds through mid-1998. Observing the 
"ground truth" behind the survey re-
sponses was a primary purpose of pro-
grammatic site assessments in 30 grantee 
agenCieS. 
7. To what extent did grantees' 
organizations change through 1998 
to support and sustain community 
policing? We obtained national profiles 
of organizational change using the survey 
methodology we adopted for program-
matic change and observed "ground 
truth" during site visits. In addition, the 
question was addressed through 10 case 
studies conducted under subcontract by 
the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and 
Management of the Kennedy School of 
Government. 
Researc h i n Brief 
and assigned grant advisors to main-
tain regular telephone contact. The 
Monitoring Division monitored compli-
ance through site visits to 432 grantees 
in 1998, with a planned expansion to 
900 in 1999. The OC established a 
separate branch to monitor compliance 
with financial and administrative re-
quirements and to monitor the ad-
equacy of grantees' accounting and 
administrative controls. The Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) audited 
COPS grantees onsite in search of pos-
sible violations of the Title I statute. 
Between 1996 and 1998, as the COPS 
Office process of awarding grants 
yielded some of the center stage to 
compliance activities, the satisfaction 
of large local/county agencies with 
COPS Office operations declined 
somewhat. The percentage of hiring 
grantees describing COPS grants as 
easier than others to administer de-
clined from 63 to 4 7 between 1996 
and 1998. Although nearly 90 percent 
continued to describe their grant advi-
sors as helpful, the percentage who 
found them "easy to reach" dropped 
from 81 to 74 percent. 
COPS application decisions 
This section describes who partici-
pated in local decisions to apply, what 
considerations weighed in their deci-
sions, and what their future applica-
tion plans were as of 1998. 
Who participated in agencies' 
application decisions? 
Law enforcement agencies' decisions 
to apply for Federal grants are typi-
cally a fairly closed process, involving 
the chief law enforcement executive, 
elected officials or their staffs, and, 
in larger agencies, the unit that will 
administer the grant and the agency 
grant manager, if one exists. Yet 
many believe that community policing 
initiatives are more likely to succeed 
with broad and deep participation in 
planning throughout the agency. 
For COPS applications, agencies' chief 
executives were reportedly involved in 
virtually all decisions and elected offi-
cials in more than 80 percent. Accord-
ing to the Wave 1 survey, about half 
the agencies brought sergeants into the 
application decisions, nearly 40 per-
cent involved patrol officers, and vari-
ous segments of the community were 
brought into 20 to 45 percent of deci-
sions. Less than 25 percent involved 
union representatives. Despite COPS 
Office success in simplifying applica-
tion procedures, some 40 percent of 
applicants nevertheless involved con-
sultants in the application process. 
Which agencies became 
grantees, and why? 
An estimated 19,175law enforcement 
agencies were eligible for COPS 
grants. This estimate was obtained by 
merging law enforcement agency lists 
maintained by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, the FBI's National Crime 
Information Center, the UCR Section, 
and the COPS Office. Duplicate re-
cords were removed and agencies that 
appeared to be ineligible deleted. Of 
these agencies, 10,537 (55 percent) 
requested and received at least one 
COPS grant by the end of 1997. Of 
grant recipients, 761, or about 7 per-
cent, had withdrawn by March 1998. 
After the COPS startup period, when 
short application deadlines and related 
local logistical problems discouraged 
some agencies from applying immedi-
ately, financial considerations became 
the primary influence on agencies' 
decisions not to apply. Financial con-
cerns during the grant period-the 
explicit 25 percent match requirement 
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and the implicit match needed to cover 
annual salary and fringe benefits ex-
ceeding $33,333 and collateral costs 
of an officer, such as training and 
equipment-were the most commonly 
mentioned reasons given in 1996 by 
agencies for their decisions not to 
apply in 1995. By mid-1998, concern 
over the cost of retaining the officers 
after grant expiration was the primary 
influence on decisions not to apply, 
and this concern also led to an esti-
mated 40 percent of the agency with-
drawals. At that time, the nature of the 
retention requirement was unclear: the 
U.S. Department of Justice had not 
announced the length of the required 
retention period (one complete budget 
cycle after grant expiration), and we 
believe the prevailing assumption was 
a much longer and more costly period. 
Resistance to community policing was 
not a significant deterrent to applying 
for COPS grants. Objections to com-
munity policing or to Federal grants 
in general were mentioned by only 
8 percent of respondents. Moreover, 
88 percent of the largest agencies in 
our sample that had received LLEBG 
funds reported that they were using 
them to support community policing 
even though there was no requirement 
to do so. It appears that by covering 
collateral costs not covered by COPS 
grants, the advent of LLEBG may have 
encouraged participation in the COPS 
program. 
What are agencies' future 
application plans? 
In June-July 1998, the program 
remained popular among grantees: 
74 percent oflocal/county grantees 
stated they were planning to apply for 
at least one additional COPS grant in 
1998 or 1999, as were 66 percent of 
small agencies Uurisdictions of less 
than 50,000), 78 percent of medium-
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size agencies (50,001-150,000), and 
89 percent of large agencies (150,001 
or more). Among the prospective 
applicants, MORE technology grants 
were resoundingly popular: 20 percent 
planned to apply for that type only, 
and an additional 41 percent planned 
to request MORE-funded technology 
in combination with officer hiring, 
civilians, or both. The most popular 
combination was technology plus 
sworn officers (25 percent of prospec-
tive applicants). Six percent planned 
to apply for hiring grants only, and 
3 percent for civilians only. 
As with prior application decisions, 
financial considerations strongly influ-
ence future intentions. Of the large 
local/county agencies surveyed in 
Wave 3, the local match requirement 
was described as "very important" by 
55 percent of the agencies, restrictions 
on allowable purposes for which grant 
funds could be spent by 48 percent, 
restrictions on allowable types of re-
sources by 43 percent, and uncovered 
collateral costs by 40 percent. 
Distribution of COPS funds 
This section summarizes the number 
and dollar amounts of COPS grant 
awards and their distribution pattern. 
What is the total value of COPS 
grants for increasing the level of 
policing? 
By the end of 1997, according to 
COPS Office records, awards had been 
announced of 18,138 grants worth 
$3.4 7 billion. Of those, 754 were for 
innovative programs. The remaining 
17,384 grants were intended to in-
crease the level of policing. They car-
ried a total of $3.388 billion in awards: 
about 16 percent under COPS MORE, 
and 84 percent under hiring grant pro-
grams including PHS and COPS Phase 
I. These programs, plus FAST, AHEAD, 
and UHP supported the hiring of 
approximately 41,000 officers. COPS 
MORE supported the acquisition of 
other resources (primarily technology 
and civilians) whose productivity was 
projected to yield the FTE of approxi-
mately 22,400 additional officers for at 
least 3 years, for a total of 63,400 of-
ficers and equivalents. 
By May 12, 1999, according to COPS 
Office press releases, another $1.9 
billion had been awarded, about 74 
percent under hiring grants and the 
remainder under MORE. At a cer-
emony that day, the White House 
announced that the goal of funding 
100,000 police officers had been 
reached. By then, the COPS Office 
and its predecessors had awarded an 
estimated $4.27 billion in hiring 
grants and another $1.017 billion in 
MORE grants, for a total of $5.387 bil-
lion, exclusive of innovative program 
support. These funds supported the 
hiring of 60,900 officers and the ac-
quisition of other resources projected 
to yield 39,600 FTEs of officer time 
through productivity gains. 
How were COPS funds 
distributed? 
Eligible agencies' application deci-
sions led to significant variation by 
region, but regional patterns differed 
depending on how they were mea-
sured. The Pacific region ranked first 
in terms of the percentage of eligible 
agencies receiving grants but third in 
terms of COPS dollars awarded per 
capita and sixth in terms of COPS 
dollars per crime. The Mid-Atlantic 
region ranked eighth in terms of 
agency participation but first on both 
the per capita and per crime measures. 
Of all agencies selected for awards by 
the end of 1997, 4 percent served core 
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city jurisdictions (i.e., central cities of 
Census Bureau Metropolitan Statisti-
cal Areas), which are home to 27 per-
cent of the U.S. population. They 
received 40 p<~rcent of COPS dollar 
awards for all programs combined, and 
62 percent of all COPS MORE funds. 
On average nationwide, core cities re-
ceived substantially larger awards per 
10,000 residents ($151,631) than did 
the rest of the country ($86,504). How-
ever, their average award per 1,000 
index crimes ($184,980) was less than 
two-thirds the average for the rest of 
the country ($299,963). 
Which types of agencies received 
the most COPS grants? 
Some 75 percent of hiring and MORE 
funds went to municipal or county 
police agencies, 15 percent to sheriffs 
and State police agencies, and the re-
mainder to a variety of special juris-
dictions. As required by Title I, dollars 
awarded were about evenly split be-
tween jurisdictions with populations of 
more than 150,000 and smaller ones. 
The growth in awards during 1996 and 
1997 was driven largely by repeat 
awards to existing grantees rather than 
by first awards to new grantees. By the 
end of 1997, $1.42 billion, or 4 7 per-
cent of all funds designated for award, 
had been allocated to agencies with 
four or more grants. As a result, the 
distribution of COPS funds became 
skewed, so that through 1998 the 
1 percent of grantee agencies with the 
largest grants had received 41 percent 
of grant funds. 
Did COPS funds go where the 
crime was? 
Awards to repeat grantees helped to 
focus cumulative COPS awards on 
jurisdictions that suffer disproportion-
ately from serious crime. Of the 8,062 
UCR contributors that had received 
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at least one hiring grant by Decemher 
1997 or one MORE grant by June 
1998, the 1 percent with the largest 
1997 murder counts received 31 per-
cent of all funds awarded through the 
end of 1997. They reported 54 percent 
of all U.S. murden;. The 10 percent 
with the highest murder counts re-
ceived 50 percent of total COPS 
awards. A nearly identical pattern 
occurred with respect to robbery. 
Officer hiring, deployment, 
and retention planning 
After the COPS Office announced 
awards, OC reviewed and approved 
the budget and obligated the Federal 
funds. Following OC approval and ob-
ligation of the funds, the COPS Ofiice 
mailed a formal award package in-
forming grantees of all conditions. 
Grantees were allowed to draw down 
funds only after they had returned a 
signed acceptance of the award and 
conditions to the COPS Office. For the 
hiring grants, in which conditions were 
fairly standard and most OC review 
issues involved merely calculation of 
salary and fringe benefits, these pro-
cesses moved fairly smoothly, even 
through the Federal budget dispute 
and Government shutdown in 1995-
96. During those years, the mean 
elapsed time between COPS Office 
receipt of the application and mailing 
the award package to the grantee was 
149-154 days for hiring programs, and 
grantees who had returned their signed 
acceptances by mid-1997 did so in an 
average of 70-75 days, for a total 
elapsed time of about 224 days. 
How did officer hiring and 
deployment proceed? 
Onee funds became obligated and 
available to spend, hiring of COPS-
funded offieers proceeded smoothly 
throughout the entire 1996-93 
observation period. In 1996, more than 
95 percent of agencies reported hiring 
their officers within l0-12 months of 
award obligation. As of June 1998, 
33 percent of medium and large local! 
county grantees reported they had 
hired all their officers funded through 
the end of 1997. Nearly 70 percent of 
them reported that all of their officers 
had finished training and begun work-
ing in their first regular assignments. 
All the agencies reported that they 
expected to have 100 percent of their 
officers awarded through 1997 on the 
street hy June 2000. 
As of the 1996 Wave 1 survey, half of 
all small-agency (COPS FAST) grant-
ees reported deploying their new offic-
ers directly to community policing and 
38 percent assigned them to "backfill" 
in routine patrol assignments for more 
experienced officers redeployed to 
community policing. About 68 percent 
of medium- and large-agency (COPS 
AHEAD) grantees reported using the 
backfill strategy, which the COPS 
Office recommended. 
How are COPS-funded officers 
spending their time? 
Two of the three prime components 
of community policing articulated by 
the COPS Office-partnership build-
ing and problem solving-were the 
most commonly expected uses of 
COPS-funded officers' time; eaeh 
was mentioned by about 40 pereent of 
the medium and large local/county 
agencies in the Wave 3 sample. About 
26 percent of those agencies reported 
their COPS-funded officers would 
spend substantial amounts of time on 
"quality of life" policing, a style some 
believe requires strong control by the 
community if it is not to undermine 
community partnership building. Rou-
tine patrol and "squeezing in proactive 
work" were hoth mentioned by around 
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30 percent of agencies. The COPS-
funded officers were expected to spend 
substantial time on routine patrol 
by 40 percent of the agencies with 
agencywide community policing and 
by 24 percent of agencies with special-
ized community policing units. Some 
23 percent of the agencies reported 
their COPS-funded officers would 
spend at least some of their time on 
undercover and tactical assignments, 
and 35 percent expeded them to 
spend at least some time on adminis-
trative or technical assignments. 
As an indirect measure of COPS-
funded officers' activities, we asked 
how those activities were affecting 
other agencies. Among the large local/ 
county grantees, B3 percent reported 
greater demands on code enforcement 
and sanitation agencies; 33 percent re-
ported greater demands on community 
organizations and businesses; and 66 
percent reported greater demands on 
agencies that deal with violence in the 
home. These impacts are consistent 
with direct reports of strong emphasis 
on problem solving ami partnership 
building, along with referrals of do-
mestic violence cases. 
How were agencies planning 
to retain the COPS-funded 
officers as of 1998? 
Through the 3-year hiring grant peri-
mls, 98 percent of respondents re-
ported they had either kept their 
COPS-funded officers on staff or re-
placed departed officers expeditiously. 
At the time of the Wave 3 survey in 
1998, our sample contained few agen-
cies with expired grants. Therefore, 
findings are limited to plans and 
expectations regmding retention, not 
actual retention experience. 
The Wave 3 survey was conducted 
before the COPS Office announeed the 
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length of grantees' retention commit-
ment: compliance with the retention 
requirement requires keeping grant-
funded officer positions filled using lo-
cal funds for at least one budget cycle 
beyond grant expiration. Despite the 
uncertainty, approximately 66 percent 
of Wave 3 respondents reported they 
were "certain" their agencies would 
retain the COPS-funded officers when 
their grants expired. Another 24 per-
cent indicated they were "almost posi-
tive" they would retain the officers; 
6 percent were "pretty sure"; only 4 
percent stated they were "not sure at 
all." 
Next, respondents were asked whether 
they agreed or disagreed with a series 
of statements intended to describe in 
more detail their expectations about 
how their agencies would retain the 
COPS-funded officers. About 95 per-
cent reported that the COPS-funded 
officers either were or would be part of 
the agency's base budget by the time 
the grant expired. About 52 percent 
stated they were uncertain about long-
term retention plans. Only 10 percent 
of the respondents reported that de-
spite the "good faith effort" required 
as a grant condition, unforeseen condi-
tions were likely to keep their agencies 
from retaining all of the positions. 
Other common responses are diffi cult 
to interpret and suggest that despite 
extensive COPS Office efforts to edu-
cate agencies about the retention re-
quirement, the persons authorized to 
speak to our interviewers on behalf of 
the agencies may have been uncertain 
about what the requirement entailed. 
About 37 percent reported expecting 
that the COPS-funded officers would 
be retained by "using positions that 
open up" (i.e., through attrition, indi-
eating an intention to retain the COPS-
funded officers but not the positions). 
About 20 percent reported expecting 
that the COPS-funded officers would 
be retained by cutting back positions 
elsewhere, a plan that would constitute 
supplanting under many common 
conditions; 5 percent agreed that the 
COPS-funded officers were likely to be 
retained both through attrition and by 
cutbacks elsewhere. Now that there-
tention requirement has been spelled 
out in more detail, we are reexamining 
long-term retention plans in the Wave 
4 survey. 
MORE awards and projected 
productivity gains 
COPS MORE was a pivotal component 
of the COPS program. From the 
administration's perspective, MORE 
was key because it accounted for 39 
percent of the 100,000-officer total but 
only 19 percent of the COPS budget. 
From the grantees' perspective, 
MORE-funded resources, especially 
technology, were extremely attractive 
because they promised a variety of 
local benefits without the burden of 
postgrant retention costs that new of-
ficers carried. This section describes 
what is being acquired with COPS 
MORE awards, how implementation 
of MORE-funded technology and 
achievement of productivity gains is 
proceeding, and how MORE-funded 
civilians are being integrated into 
grantee agencies. 
How are COPS MORE funds 
being allocated and used? 
COPS MORE has been especially 
popular with large jurisdictions, and 
awards have been more heavily con-
centrated than hiring grant awards in 
relatively few agencies. Of the 17 
agencies serving populations of more 
than 1 million, 53 percent had re-
ceived at least one COPS MORE grant 
by the end of 1998, compared with just 
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5 percent of agencies serving popula-
tions less than 25,000. By the end of 
1997, the 1 percent of grantees with 
the largest MORE grants had received 
48 percent of the $528 million award-
ed to that point, compared with 37 per-
cent for the largest hiring grantees. 
The concentration of large MORE 
grants was even greater among local/ 
county police agencies, and it in-
creased slightly during 1998. 
In 1996, the General Accounting Of-
fice reported that technology absorbed 
just over half of 1995 COPS MORE 
resources, civilians somewhat less, 
and overtime less than 10 percent. 
Overtime was not supported by COPS 
MORE after that year. By 1998, 38 
percent of MORE grantees had been 
funded exclusively for technology, 
another 44 percent for both technology 
and civilians, and 5 percent for tech-
nology, civilians, and overtime. 
What is the relationship between 
COPS MORE grants and counts of 
officers? 
To receive a MORE grant, an appli-
cant had to produce a credible projec-
tion that the funded resources would 
yield at least four FTEs in increased 
productivity per $100,000 of grant 
funds-the rate at which Federal 
COPS funds supported officer hiring. 
On average, in a random sample of 
1995 MORE grant applications, civil-
ians were projected to yield 4.54 FTEs 
per $100,000, largely through replace-
ment of officers on a one-for-one basis. 
Technology projections averaged 6.12 
FTEs per $100,000 
Starting in 1996, the COPS Office 
began converting dollars from 
MORE technology grants to projected 
FTEs at the four-per-$100,000 mini-
mum needed to demonstrate cost-
effectiveness-a more conservative 
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assumption than applicants' projec-
tions. The conservative projections 
were used in COPS Office estimates of 
total FTEs funded and were the stan-
dard of accountability imposed on 
grantees. Even under the conservative 
assumption, technology accounts for 
64 percent of total productivity gains 
projected for COPS MORE. 
Implementation of MORE-funded 
technology 
Starting with the budget review and 
funding obligation process, COPS 
MORE technology implementation was 
problematic. Because of the additional 
complexity of COPS MORE plans and 
budgets, Federal processing of appli-
cations required at least 4 months 
longer than hiring grants. For 1996 
applicants, the average time between 
receiving a MORE application at the 
COPS Office and mailing the award 
package to the grantee was 269 days, 
compared with 149 days for hiring 
programs. 
Between October 1995 and April 
1996, the MORE award process was 
stretched out even further by a Federal 
budget confrontation. A Government 
shutdown halted OC review of 1995 
applications in the pipeline. Also, un-
certainty over the fiscal1996 COPS 
Office budget delayed award decisions 
on applications received just before 
the September 30 end of fiscal1995, 
which had pushed the total requests 
for fiscal1995 beyond available 
MORE resources. As a result, success-
ful1995 MORE applicants waited an 
average of 16 months between submit-
ting their applications and receiving 
authority to draw down funds. 
What types of technology were 
acquired and what redeployment 
was projected? At the time of our 
Wave 1 survey in 1996, few agencies 
had received more than one MORE 
grant, and so most local/county MORE 
technology grantees were pursuing 
only one type of technology. By far the 
most common was mobile computers, 
being implemented by an estimated 60 
percent of these agencies, followed by 
management/administrative computers 
(23 percent) and booking/arraignment 
technology (10 percent). Some agen-
cies were pursuing telephone reporting 
systems (2 percent), Computer Aided 
Dispatch (CAD) systems (1 percent), 
and other technologies such as geo-
mapping and reverse 911 systems. 
By 1998, many MORE agencies were 
implementing more than one type of 
technology. Therefore, the percentage 
of agencies implementing each tech-
nology type had grown to 79 percent 
for mobile computers, to 45 percent for 
management/administrative comput-
ers, to 12 percent for CAD systems 
and booking/arraignment technology, 
and to 6 percent for telephone report-
ing systems. The 1996-98 changes 
make clear that most CAD and tele-
phone reporting system projects were 
begun more recently than most mobile 
and management/administrative com-
puter projects. 
Although automated COPS Office 
records do not allow one to attribute 
projected ITEs to specific technolo-
gies, it was possible to compute the 
number of FTEs for categories of 
MORE technology grantees based on 
their combinations of funded technolo-
gies. These computations suggest that 
the mobile computers were projected 
to play an important role in increasing 
productivity. Of 16,870 projected 
FTEs funded through June 1998, 
34 percent were generated by agencies 
with mobile computers only, and 
29 percent by agencies with a combi-
nation of mobile computers, manage-
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ment/administrative computers, and 
other technologies. Only 24 percent 
were projected to come from agencies 
without mobile computers. 
The knowledge base from which MORE 
applicants could develop their projec-
tions of FTEs saved through productiv-
ity gains was sparse. For most of the 
technologies, projections clustered 
around 2.4 hours per officer per shift, 
slightly more than the 2 hours used by 
the COPS Office as an example in the 
MORE application kit. 
How rapidly is implementation 
proceeding? Technology implemen-
tation was far from complete as of 
summer 1998, even by agencies whose 
first COPS MORE grant was awarded 
under the 1995 program. Among 
those agencies, 61 percent reported 
that management/administrative com-
puters were fully operational, as did 
4 7 percent for telephone reporting 
systems, 45 percent for booking/ar-
raignment systems, 44 percent for 
mobile computers, 39 percent for CAD 
systems, and 65 percent for other tech-
nologies. For computing technologies, 
implementation has proceeded most 
rapidly among small agencies: 50 per-
cent of agencies serving jurisdictions 
of less than 50,000 have all mobile 
computers operational, compared with 
23 percent of agencies with jurisdic-
tions of more than 150,000. For man-
agement/administrative computers, 
the comparable percentages are 
78 percent and 53 percent. 
Some management/administrative and 
mobile computers were not operational 
simply because they were purchased 
not long before the Wave 3 survey. 
Nevertheless, for two reasons these fig-
ures probably understate the adverse 
effect of delays in mobile computer 
implementation on achievement of 
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projected productivity increases. 
First, CAD and telephone system 
projects began, on average, under 
more recent grants than computer 
implementation. Second, the one avail-
able time study indicates that any pro-
jected mobile computer productivity 
increases will be due to wireless field 
reporting, which eliminates trips to 
stations to write reports-not from 
wireless inquiry functions applicable 
to driver's license, vehicle registration, 
and other files. The inquiry capability 
produces benefits such as improved 
officer safety, elimination of waits for 
clear voice-radio channels, and pro-
tection from scanners but are unlikely 
to save measurable officer time that 
can be redeployed to community polic-
ing. Yet, to our knowledge, as of June 
1999, no major police department has 
achieved departmentwide implementa-
tion of wireless field reporting, al-
though three are reportedly in the final 
phases of testing. Therefore, all the 
agencies that reported they had opera-
tional mobile computers were referring 
to inquiry capability, not wireless field 
reporting. 
What productivity gains are 
being achieved and reallocated 
to community policing? 
Because of the delays in technology 
implementation, the 1998 Wave 3 sur-
vey offers only a fragmentary basis for 
comparing actual productivity gains 
with those projected in MORE grant 
applications. As of June 1998, MORE 
grantees from 1995 expected to ach-
ieve only about 49 percent of the pro-
jected FTEs, but the Wave 3 sample 
was not designed to produce a defini-
tive national estimate. The estimate of 
productivity gains will be updated in a 
future report based on the Wave 4 sur-
vey in 2000, when more grantees are 
expected to have experience with fully 
operational technology. 
What other benefits and costs of 
technology are local agencies 
experiencing? 
Although prospects for achieving 100 
percent of the projected productivity 
gains are not encouraging at this time, 
agencies report expecting or achieving 
a variety of other benefits from their 
mobile computers, even without wire-
less transmission capability. These 
include: 
• Automated.field reporting: more 
complete, accurate, and recent 
real-time information and perma-
nent records; improved crime/data 
analysis capability; more accurate/ 
complete/timely records; improved 
spelling/grammar/legibility; more 
report writing; easier retrieval of 
information; shorter review process; 
and reduced time for records staff. 
• Wireless query and response 
functions: improved officer safety 
due to faster, more secure responses 
to queries regarding license plates, 
vehicle registrations, and persons; 
secure car-to-car communication; 
and fewer demands on dispatchers. 
• Increased effectiveness: higher 
clearance and conviction rates due 
to improved reports; better recovery 
of stolen property; positive response 
from the community (though some 
report adverse reactions from vic-
tims and witnesses); more informa-
tion sharing across shifts; better 
communications with neighboring 
agencies; better tracking of commu-
nity events; easier provision of in-
formation to the public; and better 
preparation for court. 
• Agency benefits: opportunity for 
staff to learn computers; officer 
morale booster (sometimes after a 
break-in period); and expected 
financial savings in the long run. 
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Agencies also experienced extra costs 
due to the new technology. The most 
common were computer staff time, sys-
tem installation time, and time to train 
personnel in the use of the technolo-
gies. Time incurred by computer staff 
and/or vendors was an especially com-
mon expense in agencies with ongoing 
technology projects that MORE-
funded technology had to fit. Some 
agencies that anticipated the costs 
included them in their initial grant 
budgets without sacrificing the cost-
effectiveness of their MORE programs. 
Depending on technology type, 23 to 
27 percent of MORE technology grant-
ees implementing the five most com-
mon technology categories reported 
that unexpected implementation costs 
increased the local cost of their MORE 
grants by at least 10 percent over the 
match they had originally planned. 
Not surprisingly, the likelihood of an 
agency experiencing unexpected costs 
increased as implementation pro-
gressed. The percentage reporting 
unexpected costs rose from 21 percent 
of agencies with mobile computers not 
fully implemented to 31 percent of 
agencies that had completed imple-
mentation. The percentage reporting 
unexpected costs rose from 22 percent 
to 29 percent for agencies implement-
ing desktop computers, from 26 per-
cent to 43 percent for CAD systems, 
from 3 percent to 60 percent for 
automated booking systems, and from 
12 percent to 32 percent for tele-
phone-reporting systems. 
Three categories of cost have been 
especially problematic for agencies 
funded for mobile computers, espe-
cially those pursuing wireless field 
reporting. These are upgraded tele-
communications capacity; integration 
of field reporting with existing (or 
developing) records management 
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systems; and vehicle mounts, which 
were frequently designed from scratch . 
Use of MORE-funded civilians 
This section describes the functions 
being performed by MORE-funded 
civilians, civilian hiring and retention, 
and deployment of the officers re-
placed by the new civilians. 
How did hiring, deployment, and 
retention of civilians proceed? 
During 1995, the first year of COPS 
MORE, the program awarded $145 
million to fund civilians to create 
6,506 FTEs of sworn officer time. 
By June 1998, this amount had risen 
to $287.2 million to support 12,975 
FTEs. At that time, more than 80 per-
cent of grantee agencies reported hav-
ing completed their civilian hiring, 
and all expected to complete their ci-
vilian hiring by the end of 1999. Sixty-
four percent of grantees reported that 
all their civilian hires were still on 
staff, and 80 percent of the remainder 
reported that they had replaced all 
who had left. An estimated 96 percent 
reported that the civilians were saving 
officer Lime, and, for the four most 
common civilian positions, 73 to 80 
percent of agencies reported that their 
new civilians had been used either to 
create a new position or to increase the 
total number of people in each position. 
The MORE civilian program appears 
to have provided modest encourage-
ment Lo an ongoing Lrend toward 
c:ivilianization. Approximately 45 per-
cent of MORE civilian grant recipients 
claimed to be already in the process 
of civilianization when they received 
their grants. The annual average in-
crease in civilians between 1993 and 
1997 (which span the early COPS 
years) was 4 percent, up from 3 per-
cent annually over the preceding 
:1 years. 
What functions are the MORE-
funded civilians performing? 
MORE-funded civilians were hired to 
increase resources for community po-
licing in four ways: 
I. Shedding routine tasks from sworn 
officers to civilians, such as cleri-
cal/administrative positions (e.g., 
typing, filing, scheduling duty ros-
ters, taking phone messages) and 
record maintenance. 
2. Replacing sworn personnel in exist-
ing specialist positions, such as 
desk/duty officers, dispatchers, 
telephone reporting unit staff, and 
evidence technicians. 
3. Filling new or existing specialist 
positions that are expected to im-
prove officer productivity, such as 
computer technicians. 
4. Staffing new community policing 
positions, such as community coor-
dinators/organizers, domestic vio-
lence specialists, or CPTED (Crime 
Prevention Through Environmental 
Design) planners. 
The most common assignments of 
MORE-funded civilians were to cleri-
cal/administrative positions (43 per-
cent of agencies assigned at least some 
civilians to such positions), dispatch-
ers (34 percent), and telephone re-
sponse unit members (26 percent). 
COPS effects on policing levels 
The effect of the COPS program on 
policing levels is the total of the two 
components discussed in the preced-
ing sections. The first is sworn officers 
hired through COPS grants and re-
tained after the grants expire. The sec-
ond is productivity gains, measured in 
officer FTEs yielded by MORE-funded 
resources. This report contains pre-
liminary estimates of both effects, 
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which should be treated with caution 
for several reasons. First, anticipating 
the Wave 4 survey, we did not design 
Wave 3 to survey a representative 
sample of small local/county agencies 
or, indeed, any samples of other types 
of agencies. Second, Wave 3 data were 
collected at a time when grantees had 
little actual experience on which to 
base estimates of two key factors in the 
projections: the percentage of hired 
officers that will be retained following 
the required period and the actual 
number of FTEs generated from re-
sources acquired with COPS MORE 
grants. The Wave 4 survey and other 
data will be used to produce updated, 
more valid, estimates. 
With these cautions in mind, we report 
estimates of COPS program impacts 
as of two points in time: the impact, 
through the end of 1998, of grants 
awarded through 1997; and the long-
term impact of grants awarded through 
May 12, 1999, the date the White 
House announced that the goal of fund-
ing 100,000 officers had been met. 
How will COPS hiring grants 
affect the number of law 
enforcement officers in the 
United States? 
Wave 3 survey data were first used to 
estimate the number of COPS-funded 
officers hired as of June 1998. 
Through 1997, the COPS Office had 
awarded hiring grants for 41,000 offic-
ers; survey results indicate that about 
39,000 of them had been hired. The 
difference reflects grantee delays in 
accepting awards, recruiting candi-
dates, and hiring officers. 
This gross increase is partially offset 
hy delays in filling vacancies for non-
COPS positions, and cross-hiring 
between agencies. Allowing for these 
factors, we estimate that the 41,000 
••• Research in Brie • I 
officers awarded by the COPS Office 
as of the end of 1997 resulted in ana-
tional net increase of between 36,300 
and 37,500 officers by the end of 
1998. 
In the longer term, offsetting factors 
include certain federally approved 
cuts in sworn force size and less-than-
complete retention of COPS-funded 
positions beyond the 3-year grant pe-
riod. Given the uncertainty surround-
ing these factors, a best case scenario 
would have grantees retain 91 percent 
of their new hires indefinitely, and a 
worst case scenario would result in a 
64 percent retention rate. 
By May 1999, the COPS Office had 
awarded agencies approximately 
60,900 officers through hiring grants. 
Under the best case scenario, these 
awards will proCiuce an estimated peak 
effect of 57,200 officers by the year 
2001 and, after postgrant attrition, the 
permanent effect of the grants will sta-
bilize at an estimated 55,400 officers 
by 2003. The minimum retention 
scenario, in contrast, suggests that the 
net impact of these awards will peak at 
48,900 oificers in 2000 but decline to 
a permanent level of 39,000 by 2003. 
How will COPS MORE grants 
affect the number of FTE 
officers redeployed through 
increased productivity? 
Estimates of time savings from MORE 
grants were based on the Wave 3 sur-
vey, which contained a representative 
sample of 1995 municipal and county 
MORE grantees. To develop prelimi-
nary national estimates, we extrapo-
lated the results of these agencies to 
other types of agencies and later co-
horts of MORE grantees. 
By the summer of 1998, the COPS 
Office had awarded agencies 22,400 
FTEs through MORE grants for civil-
ians and technology, and survey 
results indicate that grantees had 
redeployed 6,400 FTEs with these 
grants. At that time, however, only 
23 to 78 percent of MORE technology 
grantees (depending on agency popu-
lation category and type of technology) 
described some or all components of 
their technology as fully operational. 
Therefore, grantees were also asked to 
estimate future productivity increases 
they expected to achieve once all 
grants were fully implemented. 
Agencies that had progressed the fur-
thest in making their technology op-
erational projected productivity gains 
that were smaller (60 percent of the 
original projections) than those ex-
pected by MORE grantees as a whole 
(72 percent of the original projections), 
suggesting that agencies adjust their 
expected productivity gains downward 
as they gain more experience with op-
erational technology. 
We used those figures to compute best 
case and worst case interim estimates 
but recognize the worst: case estimates 
are based on only a partial subsample 
that has substantial implementation 
experience. This subsample is growing 
and becoming more representative 
over time, and so revisions of esti-
mates of MORE-supported productiv-
ity increases are plmmed in 2000 
using Wave 4 survey data. 
Using these assumptions and an esti-
mated 3-year timeframe for full imple-
mentation by grantees, we estimate 
that by the end of 1998, between 
9,100 and 10,900 officers were rede-
ployed from resources funded by 
MORE grants awarded by the end of 
1997. If these implementation patterns 
hold for post-1998 MORE grants, the 
39,600 FTEs awarded as of May 1999 
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will result in the redeployment of 
between 23,800 and 28,500 FTEs 
by 2002. 
What will be the combined 
effect of hiring and MORE 
grants awarded by May 1999 
on the level of policing? 
By May 1999, the COPS Office had 
awarded approximately 100,500 offic-
ers and officer equivalents through 
hiring grants and MORE grants. Our 
estimates for the two types of grants 
are combined in exhibit 2. Upper 
bound projections based on June 1998 
survey estimates of maximum officer 
retention and maximum officer rede-
ployment suggest that these awards 
will result in a peak national net 
increase of 84,600 officers and equiva-
lents by the year 2001, before declin-
ing somewhat and stabilizing at a 
permanent level of 83,900 by 2003. 
Lower bound projections based on es-
timates of minimum officer retention 
and minimum officer redeployment 
suggest that the COPS-supported in-
crease in the number of officers and 
FTEs deployed at any point in time 
will peak at 69,000 officers in the year 
2001 and decline to a permanent level 
of 62,700 by 2003. 
Total COPS-funded FTEs added to 
police agencies throughout this period 
will be greater than the number avail-
able during any [JUrlieular year, espe-
cially if our lower bound projections 
prove more accurate. In this regard, 
the COPS program might be compared 
with an "open house" event, in which 
the total number of visitors to the 
event is larger than the number 
present at any given point in time. 
Using this open house concept, we 
estimate that COPS awards made 
through May 1999 will result in the 
temporary or permanent hiring of 
60,900 offieers and the deployment 
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of between 23,800 and 28,500 ITEs, 
thereby adding between 84,700 and 
89,400 FTEs to the Nation's police 
agencies at some point between 1994 
and 2003, though not all these ITEs 
will be simultaneously in service at 
any single point in time. 
Whether the program will ever in-
crease the number of officers and 
equivalents to 100,000 on the street at 
a single point in time is not clear. The 
COPS Office has continued to award 
COPS grants since May 1999. If the 
agency continues to award hiring and 
MORE grants in the same proportions 
and our upper bound projections are 
correct, roughly 19,000 additional 
officers and equivalents awarded could 
be enough to eventually produce an 
indefinite increase of 100,000 officers 
on the street. If the lower bound as-
sumptions are more accurate, the pro-
gram may require an additional 59,000 
officers and equivalents awarded to 
create a lasting increase of 100,000 of-
ficers. More definitive answers to these 
questions will be available following 
completion of the Wave 4 survey in 
2000. 
COPS and the style of 
American policing 
The COPS Office listed four principal 
goals of community policing: building 
Exhibit 2. Estimates of COPS Impact on Level of U.S. Policing 
police-community partnerships, prob-
lem solving, crime prevention, and 
organizational support for these pro-
grammatic objectives. The evaluation 
used three approaches to observe how 
the COPS program affected law en-
forcement agencies' pursuit of these 
goals. First, at three points in time, the 
national survey of agencies measured 
agency representatives' official state-
ments about the implementation status 
in COPS grantee and nongrantee agen-
cies of 4 7 tactics for pursuing these 
objectives, as well as the role of COPS 
funds in grantees' implementation of 
those tactics. Second, teams of police 
practitioners and researchers visited 
30 sites, many twice, for programmatic 
Awards Through December 31, 1997 Awards Through May 12, 1999 
Officers Hired and Estimated Net Hired 
FTEs Redeployed or Redeployed 
Funded (12/97) Gross (6/98) Net (12/98) Funded Projection 
Program (1) (2) (3) (4) Year (5) 
Hiring 41,000 39,000 36,300-37,500 60,900 High 
(PHS, COPS 2001 :57,200 





MORE 22,4oot + 6,400 9,100-10,900 39,600 High 
2002+ : 28,500 
Low 
2002+ : 23,800 




2001 : 69,000 
2003+ : 62,700 
t Net of 3,600 second- and third-year supplements for retaining civilians, which are included in COPS Office records of 26,000 FTEs funded. 
+ As of June 1998. 
+Indicates "steady rate" projection , e.g., 2003+ indicates "for year 2003 and beyond." 
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site assessments of the "ground truth" 
underlying agencies' statements about 
the tactics in use. Third, to explore the 
roles of local leadership and COPS 
resources in facilitating community 
policing innovations, 10 case studies 
were conducted by a Kennedy School 
of Government team. 
Has the COPS program 
advanced the adoption of 
community policing in the 
United States? 
The answer is "yes," but it must be 
quickly qualified. "Adoption of com-
munity policing" has very different 
meanings in different jurisdictions, 
and COPS funds seem more likely to 
have fueled movements that were al-
ready accelerating than to have caused 
the acceleration. 
Between 1995 and 1998, the use of a 
number of tactics commonly labeled as 
community policing swept the country 
among grantees and nongrantees. 
Among those that reportedly spread 
the fastest were citizen police acad-
emies; cooperative truancy programs 
with schools; structured problem 
solving along the lines of SARA 
(Scanning, Analysis, Response, As-
sessment); and patrolling on foot, bike, 
or other transportation modes that of-
fered more potential than patrol cars 
for interacting with citizens. Grantees 
and nongrantees alike reported revis-
ing their employee evaluation mea-
sures and their mission, vision, and 
values statements to codify their ver-
sions of community policing. Packaged 
prevention programs became almost 
universal by 1998, such as Neighbor-
hood Watch and drug resistance edu-
cation in schools, which in 1995 were 
already among the most widespread 
tactics commonly described as com-
munity policing. 
We have no measure of the extent to 
which the COPS program played vari-
ous roles that may have indirectly en-
com·aged nongrantees to adopt these 
tactics. Possible mechanisms included 
training and technical assistance 
programs and materials, publicizing 
grantees' community policing suc-
cesses, and acting as a catalyst that 
encouraged grantees to demand more 
community policing training from re-
gional and State academies. 
The advancement of community polic-
ing among nongrantees offers some 
weak evidence that the COPS program 
provided fuel but not the launch pad 
for the nationwide proliferation of 
community policing tactics between 
1995 and 1998. 
With a few exceptions, COPS grantees' 
reported use of community policing 
tactics grew more rapidly than did 
nongrantees'. However, the difference 
in reported adoption rates was statisti-
cally significant for relatively few. 
They include joint crime prevention 
projects with businesses, citizen sur-
veys, techniques for bringing the 
community more fully into problem 
solving, and bringing probation offic-
ers into problem-solving initiatives. 
Grantees were significantly more 
likely than nongrantees to report 
adopting late-night recreation pro-
grams and victim assistance programs. 
Finally, grantees were significantly 
more likely than nongrantees to 
report instituting three organizational 
changes in support of community po-
licing: new dispatch rules to increase 
officers' time in their beats, new rules 
to increase beat officers' discretion, 
and revised employee evaluation 
measures. 
In this information age, the community 
policing vocabulary is well known. 
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Federal funding rewards departments 
that profess the successful implemen-
tation of community policing prin-
ciples. In that context, survey findings 
that agencies' use of community polic-
ing tactics grew between 1995 and 
1998 could merely reflect socially de-
sirable responses , at least for COPS 
grantees. Our site visits were intended 
to learn the ground truth behind the 
survey reports and to shed light on the 
different meanings that law enforce-
ment agencies assign to strategies and 
tactics that are commonly labeled as 
community policing. Given the limited 
time on site, one might expect it to be 
difficult to separate the rhetoric of 
community policing from the reality 
of what law enforcement agencies ac-
tually do. Indeed, it often was. There-
fore, the enormous variation detected 
across sites in the operational mean-
ings of key community policing 
concepts is especially telling. 
This variation is described next. 
How are COPS grantees 
building partnerships with 
communities? 
Problem-solving partnerships for coor-
dinating the appropriate application of 
a variety of resources are common-
place in many of the agencies visited. 
Yet all too often, partnerships are in 
name only, or simply standard, tempo-
rary working arrangements. Partner-
ships with other law enforcement units 
and agencies merely to launch short-
term crackdowns are not in the spirit 
of problem solving or partnerships nor 
are partnerships in which citizens and 
business representatives are merely 
"involved," serving primarily as extra 
eyes and ears as before. True commu-
nity partnerships, involving sharing 
power and decisionmaking, are rare at 
this time, found in only a few of the 
flagship departments. Other jurisdic-
tions have begun to lay foundations for 
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true partnerships, however, and as 
problem-solving partnerships mature 
and evolve, the trust needed for power 
sharing and joint decisionmaking may 
emerge. 
How are COPS grantees 
implementing problem solving? 
Certainly, it appeared onsite that the 
majority of agencies visited are en-
gaged in problem solving, although its 
form and visibility vary widely from 
agency to agency. Some of the stron-
gest features of problem solving that 
evaluators observed included: the evo-
lution of problem solving from "special 
operations" to more complex activities 
that attack disorder and fear and re-
quire police to search for interventions 
other than arrest; administrative sys-
tems that recognize problem solving 
at multiple scales and multiple 
levels within the organizations; 
broadly distributed authority to initiate 
problem-solving "projects"; systems to 
assess the impact of particular projects 
and to learn from them; and the ability 
of the law enforcement agency to en-
gage other government agencies in de-
fining and solving community 
problems. 
In some jurisdictions, traditional en-
forcement and investigative activities 
are called problem solving under the 
community policing umbrella when 
these activities are directed toward 
problems the community has identified 
as eoneerns. Problem-solving projects 
dominated by enforcement actions, 
however, rarely advance the objectives 
of community policing, in that they 
are unlikely to either fix underlying 
causes or attract the community sup-
port needed to maintain solutions. 
Therefore, enforcement-based solu-
tions to stubborn problems are likely 
to be short term, although when sue-
cessful, they sometimes encourage 
residents to reenter public spaces and 
begin developing more permanent 
solutions. 
A visible sign of enforcement-based 
problem solving is the recent and 
growing trend toward zero-tolerance 
policing, a term also lacking consen-
sual definition. In the sites visited, 
zero tolerance policies take different 
forms. Some are manifested as zero 
tolerance efforts of short duration (e.g., 
operated for a few clays each quarter or 
once a year) with a narrow focus (e.g., 
street drug dealing or public drinking 
on the July 4) and within a circum-
scribed area (e.g., high-trafficking area 
or downtown). In other jurisdictions, 
zero tolerance is less focused. What 
might have been called a crackdown 
5 years ago is now implemented under 
zero tolerance or order maintenance 
policies and classified as part of com-
munity policing. 
Zero tolerance policies have been 
included by some agencies under 
community policing, since they often 
focus on quality of life crimes and in-
civilities, and primarily because "the 
community wants it." Zero tolerance 
policies may help achieve some goals 
of community policing within a frame-
work that uses community input in set-
ting priorities and delegates discretion 
to officers working under mission 
statements that value the dignity of 
citizens, even suspected offenders. 
However, there are dangers that with-
out adequate mechanisms for the 
diverse communities within most juris-
dictions to register their demand for or 
opposition to zero tolerance tactics, 
those tactics may directly undercut the 
objective of partnership building by 
alienating potential community part-
ners. 
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How are COPS grantees 
implementing crime prevention? 
Prevention efforts abounded in ob-
served sites, primarily manifested as 
traditional prevention programs now 
subsumed under the community 
policing label. Neighborhood Watch, 
D.A.R.E.®, and a wide variety of youth 
programs remain the mainstays of pre-
vention efforts. Beyond the standard-
ized programs, examples were rare of 
systemic prevention efforts based on 
the resolution of the underlying causes 
of crime. 
What legacy will remain from 
community policing initiatives 
stimulated or facilitated with 
COPS funds? 
There are shining stars among the 
COPS grantees that provide examples 
of what most observers would classify 
as "the best of community policing." 
There are far more agencies striving to 
change their organizations to pursue 
community policing objectives and are 
somewhere on the long and tortuous 
road. A few want nothing to do with it. 
The national survey and site visit re-
sults indicate that COPS funding has 
helped to accelerate the adoption and 
broaden the definition of "community 
policing." The effects of this massive 
support for community policing has 
both positive and negative aspects. 
Certainly, COPS funding has enabled 
a great number of law enforcement 
agencies to move ahead in their imple-
mentation of community policing as 
locally defined. Funding conditioned 
expressly on community policing 
implementation, coupled with peer 
pressure to embrace this model of po-
licing, has also led a substantial num-
ber of law enforcement agencies to 
stretch the definition of community 
polieing to include under its semantic 
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umbrella traditional quick-fix enforce-
ment, draconian varieties of zero toler-
ance, long-established prevention 
programs, and citizen advisory coun-
cils that are only advisory. 
Our supplemental study of multiple 
funding streams in large grantee agen-
cies hinted at the power of local deci-
sions to determine the course of the 
community policing movement. Of the 
100 largest grantee agencies in the na-
tional sample, 88 reported using their 
LLEBG funds to augment COPS and 
local funding of community policing, 
despite the absence of any require-
ment to do so. However, 82 of the 100 
agreed or strongly agreed that their 
"agency has a clear vision and is able 
to interpret grant requirements to sup-
port that view." 
Given the power of local decision-
makers, the COPS program will almost 
certainly wind up affecting the nature 
of policing in three ways. In some ju-
risdictions, the forces fueled by COPS 
grants will achieve the community 
policing objectives articulated by the 
COPS Office. In others, local forces 
will transform the objectives into 
something unrecognizable by forebears 
and creators of the program. In still 
others the forces will fizzle out for rea-
sons that have to do with leadership, 
implementation strategies, turnover 
at top levels, organizational processes 
within grantee agencies, and commu-
nities' capacities and willingness to 
join the enterprise. 
Precisely where each of these out-
comes occurs will not he known for 
some years. However, change seems 
most likely to he institutionalized and 
sustained when: planning for change 
is broad based; the commitment to 
change is rooted throughout the senior 
leadership of the agency and the po-
liticalleadership of the jurisdiction; 
changes are organizationwide rather 
than limited to a special unit; organi-
zational changes become embodied in 
new physical plant or technology; the 
new programmatic objectives are re-
flected in administrative systems (e.g., 
for personnel administration or perfor-
mance measurement); and the change 
redefines the culture of a department, 
or at least of an entire age or rank 
cohort within the department. 
Measures of success 
Readers of an evaluation report are 
entitled to the clearest possible answer 
to the question "Did the program suc-
ceed?" In the case of COPS, the clarity 
of the answer depends on the criterion 
for success. At least the following suc-
cess criteria warrant attention: 
• Client satisfaction. 
• Effect on the quantity or level of 
policing in the United States. 
• Effect on agencies' transitions to 
community policing. 
• Effectiveness in stimulating 
technological and organizational 
innovation. 
• Effect on crime. 
Client satisfaction 
If one considers grantees the clients 
of a Federal grant program, the COPS 
Office one-page application and cus-
tomer service orientation largely suc-
ceeded with law enforcement agencies 
serving small jurisdictions (i.e., those 
serving populations of less than 
50,000). For many of those agencies, 
COPS was their first Federal grant ex-
perience and they reported high levels 
of satisfaction with the application 
and administration processes; small 
agencies with prior Federal grant 
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experience found COPS grants easier 
than others to request and administer. 
Larger agencies tended to find admin-
istrative burdens no less burdensome 
than other grant programs, but a num-
ber of innovative departments com-
bined COPS funds with other funding 
streams to support their community 
policing initiatives. 
Simplification had one unfortunate 
consequence. By avoiding tedious 
explanations, the grant application kits 
failed to resolve ambiguity in two key 
administrative requirements: retention 
of COPS-funded officer positions and 
nonsupplanting of local fiscal effort. At 
least a few jurisdictions failed to apply 
because of their overly conservative 
interpretations. Other jurisdictions 
adopted more aggressive interpreta-
tions. Determining the compliance 
status of some of those required sev-
eral years for OIG audits, COPS Office 
appeals of audit findings, and inde-
pendent mediation to resolve disagree-
ments between OIG and the COPS 
Office regarding compliance status. 
Effect on level of policing 
Our best estimate at this time is that 
by 2003, awards through May 1999 
will have raised the level of policing 
on the street by the equivalent of 
62,700 to 83,900 full-time officers. 
This estimate contains two elements: 
39,000-55,400 hired officers (net of 
attrition and cross-hiring between 
agencies), and 23,800-28,500 full-
time equivalents (FTEs) of officer time 
created by productivity gains due to 
technology and civilians acquired 
with COPS MORE funds. To those 
who considered the level of policing in 
1994 inadequate, this constitutes suc-
cess, even though it falls well short of 
the target of "100,000 new cops on 
the heat." 
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Even though we plan to update andre-
fine these estimates after the Wave 4 
survey, the actual increase is unlikely 
ever to be known precisely, for several 
reasons. First, if the optimal number of 
police officers in a jurisdiction is re-
lated to local conditions, such as crime 
rates or tax receipts, then the bench-
mark against which the COPS-funded 
increase is counted should shift when 
conditions change. Second, only about 
half the COPS MORE grantees have 
systems in place to measure productiv-
ity gains, and because the measure-
ment requires before-and-after 
comparisons, it is already too late to 
put measurement systems in place. 
Third, even where measurement sys-
tems are in place, they are likely to 
understate the productivity gains be-
cause some of it occurs in very small 
increments of time, which officers may 
well forget to record. 
Effect on transitions to 
community policing 
It seems clear that the COPS pro-
gram accelerated transitions to locally 
defined versions of community polic-
ing in at least three ways. First, by 
stimulating a national conversation 
about community policing and provid-
ing training and technical assistance, 
the COPS program made it difficult for 
a chief executive seeking professional 
recognition to avoid considering adopt-
ing some approach that could plausi-
bly be labeled "community policing." 
Second, the COPS hiring funds and in-
novative policing grants allowed chief 
executives who were so inclined to 
add new community policing programs 
without immediately cutting back 
other programs, increasing response 
time, or suffering other adverse 
consequences. Third, the COPS funds 
created an incentive for agency execu-
tives to adopt community policing. 
Whether, in accelerating transitions to 
community policing, the COPS pro-
gram distmted or watered down the 
concept is difficult to say. Tautologi-
cally, more replications of any strategy 
that encourages tailoring to local con-
ditions will stimulate deviations from 
one specific definition of that strategy. 
In addition, two policing strategies 
burst onto the national scene during 
the life of COPS but apparently inde-
pendently of it: zero tolerance and 
COMPSTAT (computer comparison 
statistics), the New York City Police 
Department's system for increasing 
commanders' accountability. Although 
the obligation of COPS grantees to 
pursue community policing may have 
encouraged some police executives to 
describe those strategies as "commu-
nity policing because the community 
wants it," it seems at least plausible 
that use of those techniques would 
have proliferated even if there had 
been no COPS program. 
Effects on organizational and 
technological innovation 
In agencies whose chief executives 
were inclined toward innovation, the 
COPS program facilitated their efforts 
in several ways. First, the broad se-
mantic umbrella offered by the term 
"community policing" creates latitude 
for experimentation with new policing 
tactics and organizational structures. 
Second, the application required 
specification of a community policing 
strategy, thereby offering an occasion 
for engaging broad segments of the 
agency and community in planning 
that strategy. Third, COPS resources 
allowed departments the opportunity to 
add new modes of policing without 
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drawing resources away from existing 
priorities. Fourth, although achieving 
the projected productivity increases 
from MORE-funded mobile computers 
required telecommunications and 
other technology that was unavailable 
at the outset of COPS, the MORE 
funds fueled a large enough market to 
attract vendors' interest and to stimu-
late their efforts to satisfy the new 
demand. This represented perhaps the 
largest effort to bolster development 
of law enforcement technology since 
the recommendations of the 1967 
President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice. 
Effects on crime 
As a process evaluation, this study did 
not address the question of whether 
the COPS program had an effect on 
crime. Indeed, that question could not 
have been seriously addressed in the 
early years of COPS because "the 
COPS program" meant something 
different in each jurisdiction. 
However, the adoption of new policing 
tactics by so many agencies as they 
expanded their sworn forces does 
present an opportunity to investigate 
which tactics (or clusters of tactics) 
had beneficial effects on crime rates. 
By statistically relating local crime 
trends to the adoption of new tactics, 
it should be possible to identify prom-
ising strategies that were more likely 
than not to reduce crime more rapidly 
than the national average. Once prom-
ising strategies or tactics are identified 
statistically, semistructured site obser-
vations should help to identify the 
qualitative aspects of implementation 
that distinguish effective from ineffec-
tive uses of these promising strategies. 
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